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THE 1994 TERM OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH*
Martin H. Belskyt
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH - VICE VS. LAWYERS
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,' and almost all of the
other First Amendment cases this term, could be described as provid-
ing broader protections for speech. The prominent exception is Flor-
ida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.2 Before I discuss this case, I want to put it
into context to show not only its significance for the commercial
speech doctrine and the law of professional responsibility, but also
how individual Justices think.
Starting with the 1976 case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,3 the Supreme Court divided
speech into two categories. The most protection is given to political
speech, where the intent is to increase participation and understand-
ing of our political process and thus promote the "marketplace of
ideas" and the democratic process.4 Any restriction on such speech
will be subject to strict scrutiny, must be justified by a compelling in-
terest, and must be narrowly tailored.5 Lesser protection is given to
commercial speech, which promotes commercial or business ends.
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission of New York,6 the Supreme Court detailed the intermediate
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1994
Supreme Court Term, at The University of Tulsa College of Law, November 17, 1995.
t Dean & Professor of Law, University of Tilsa, College of Law. B.A. Temple Univer-
sity, 1965; J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 1968; Dip. Crim., Cambridge University,
1969.
1. 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995).
2. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
3. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Board of
Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
5. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, nA (1938).
6. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
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scrutiny appropriate for commercial speech. First, commercial speech
that is misleading or about unlawful activity may be totally barred.7
Other commercial speech is reviewed under a three-part standard:
Commercial speech that falls into neither of those categories, like
the advertising at issue here, may be regulated if the government
satisfies a test consisting of three related prongs: first, the govern-
ment must assert a substantial interest in support of its regulation;
second, the government must demonstrate that the restriction on
commercial speech directly and materially advances that interest;
and third, the regulation must be "narrowly drawn."8
Over the last several years, the Supreme Court has indicated its
pro-business position by expanding dramatically the commercial
speech protection, with two exceptions: (1) for vice, and (2) for law-
yers. This term, the Court even broadened protection for vice - but
narrowed commercial speech protection for lawyers.
In the case of Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,9 the Court reviewed a
Federal Alcohol Administration rule that barred including the alcohol
content on a beer label. The regulatory premise was that such label-
ing would encourage individuals to drink more harmful beer. The ad-
ministration wanted to preclude people from buying alcoholic
beverages based on the amount of alcohol. The justification for this
restriction under the Constitution was that all the government was do-
ing was regulating the sale of liquor - a vice - and under a 1986
decision, Posadas v. Puerto Rico Associates,"0 regulation of commer-
cial speech involving vice did not suffer the same scrutiny as other
commercial speech.
The Supreme Court stated that the regulation was unconstitu-
tional. Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, applied the usual com-
mercial speech test - government's interest must be substantial, must
be directly advanced by the regulation at issue, and must be narrowly
drawn."
Here, there may have been a substantial interest in curbing alco-
hol content strength wars, but this interest was not directly advanced
by the statutory scheme. The statute allowed disclosure of alcohol
7. Id. at 563.
8. Florida Bar v. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. 2371,2376 (1995) (citing Central Hudson, 447 U. S.
at 563-65).
9. 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995).
10. 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Court prohibition on casino advertisements in Puerto Rico; gam-
bling was a vice; greater power to ban the underlying activity of gambling includes the lesser
power to discourage it by limiting advertisements).
11. Rubin, 115 S. Ct. at 1589.
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content in advertisements while barring it on labels and treated wine
and spirits differently than beer.12
In footnote 2, Justice Thomas specifically overruled Posadas and
rejected any per se vice exception. He rejected the government's ar-
gument that legislatures have broader latitude to regulate speech pro-
moting socially harmful activity. Thomas indicated that the Central
Hudson test has to be applied. It might be interesting to speculate
how this opinion might affect restrictions on cigarette advertising and
labeling.
It is important to compare the Coors case to Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc. In that case, the Court said that it was perfectly appropri-
ate to provide government broad leverage to regulate lawyers' com-
mercial speech. Thus, vice speech has more protection than lawyers'
speech.
The Florida Bar has always attempted to provide for strict regula-
tion of advertising and solicitation by lawyers. It has consistently spo-
ken out against the almost twenty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence which gave commercial speech protection to lawyers'
advertising in the media and by mail. 3
Finally, in 1989, the Florida Bar came out with a comprehensive
set of proposals to limit advertising. Most of these recommendations
were accepted by the Florida Supreme Court and became binding. 4
Two of these regulations supposedly provided that a lawyer in an acci-
dent case could not contact a victim of an accident before 30 days had
passed.'5
In fact, that is not really what the regulations said. They said a
lawyer wishing to represent the accident victim cannot contact the
12. Id
13. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (mailings); Bates v. State Bar
of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (print ad).
14. The Florida Bar. Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar-Advertis-
ing Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1990).
15. FLA. RuLEs OF PROF. CoNnucr, Rule 4-7.4(b)(1) provides that:
A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent... a written communication to
a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if: (A) the
written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death or
otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communi-
cation is addressed or a relative of that person unless the accident or disaster occurred
more than 30 days prior to the mailing of the communication.
FLA. RuLEs OF PROF. CoNDucr, Rule 4-7.8(a) states that:
A lawyer shall not accept referrals from a lawyer referral service unless the service: (1)
engages in no communication with the public and in no direct contact with prospective
clients in a manner that would violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if the commu-
nication or contact were made by the lawyer.
1996]
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person for 30 days, but the lawyer representing the defendant or the
insurance company can contact the person within 30 days. To quote
the Supreme Court: "Together, these rules create a brief 30-day black-
out period after an accident during which lawyers may not, directly or
indirectly, single out accident victims or their relatives in order to so-
licit their business."16
A Florida attorney and his company, Went For It, challenged
these regulations. Because of what most thought was the clear posi-
tion of the Supreme Court in prior decisions, both the Federal District
Court17 and the Eleventh Circuit'8 held for the plaintiff19 and declared
the provisions unconstitutional under the commercial speech doctrine.
In my opinion, this case has dramatically changed the commercial
speech rules applicable to lawyers.
The government regulates lawyers. However, unlike other busi-
nesses or professions, lawyers are regulated by the Judiciary - the
Supreme Court of each state, usually acting on the advice of one or
more bar associations.20 Until about 1977, the State's power to regu-
late lawyers' commercial speech was almost total. However, in 1977,
in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,2' the Supreme Court applied the
commercial speech doctrine to a lawyer's advertisement. The Court
was sharply divided at that time and remains so today - as indicated
by Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.'
The Court in Bates, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, indicated
that advertisement was protected commercial speech and that as long
as it wasn't false or deceptive or misleading to the public, it had to be
allowed. The Court rejected all the various arguments raised by the
16. Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374 (emphasis added).
17. 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
18. 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir. 1994).
19. The original named plaintiff Stewart McHenry, the owner of the lawyer referral service,
Went For It, was disbarred after the district court decision. Another lawyer replaced him. Went
For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2374. See Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 1992).
20. In some states, like Florida and Oklahoma, there is a "unified bar" - meaning that
every individual admitted to practice in those states is automatically a member of the state bar
association. That association is asked to and usually does provide assistance to the Court in
drafting rules and regulations to govern the practice of law. FLA. RuLES OF PROF. CONDUCT,
Rule 1-3.1 (1993); Okla. Stat. tit. 5, §14 (1993).
In other states, like New York, admission to practice does not require membership in the
state bar association. Still, these voluntary bars are asked to and often do provide advice to the
Supreme Court (or in the case of New York, the highest court - the Court of Appeals) on rules
and regulations governing lawyers. N.Y. Jud. Law §460 et seq. (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1996).
21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
22. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
[Vol. 31:485
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 31 [1995], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol31/iss3/5
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Bar Associations, such as tackiness and unprofessionalism. Advertis-
ing by bankers and engineers is not regarded as undignified or unpro-
fessional and neither should advertising by lawyers. The Court
specifically rejected the idea that it was inherently misleading to pro-
vide any description of quality and that all lawyer services were
unique.23
Four Justices - Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist and Burger - each
dissented. They argued that all lawyers' services were unique and that
the needs of professionalism were sufficient to allow almost total re-
striction of advertising.24 The battle was joined.
For nearly 18 years, though with narrow majorities, and with one
exception, the Court provided increased freedom for lawyers to ad-
vertise. The one exception was allowing a ban on in-person solicita-
tion, in Chralik v. Ohio State Bar Association.5 Ohralik is a classic
example of the old maxim that bad cases make bad law; even the most
ardent defenders of commercial free speech could not be outraged by
the Court's decision.
The facts in Ohralik indicate activities that were sleazy beyond
belief - behavior right out of a John Grisham novel.26  Ohralik vis-
ited two rather young women, one in the hospital and the other in her
home. He recorded their conversations and pressed on even after he
was told by one of the women that she did not understand what was
going on. Later, her mother tried to repudiate the contract for repre-
sentation, but the lawyer said it was a binding agreement. The young
lady eventually discharged the attorney, but had to pay the full contin-
gency fee on threat of a breach of contract suit.27
It was no surprise that the Supreme Court found that Ohralik's
conduct could be barred. It was, at best, overreaching and, at worst,
coercion. This is different than the commercial speech in Bates.
Ohralik's behavior involved, said the Court, the real possibility of ex-
ternal pressure, demands for immediate response in times of distress,
could encourage speedy and uninformed decision-making, and did not
allow for disinterested comparisons in review. It was therefore not
23. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372-73.
24. Id. at 386-405.
25. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Decided the same day as Ohralik was In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978), which applied a political speech strict scrutiny test to solicitation by a representative of a
non-profit entity for a political goal (here, the ending of compelled sterilizations).
26. See JOHN GrsHAM, Tim RAInMAKER (1995).
27. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 452.
1996]
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unreasonable, or violative of the Constitution, for a state to respond
with what, in effect, was a prophylactic rule.
But except for Ohralik, a case which many distinguished as
"unique," the Court has been consistent in reiterating and applying
broadly the commercial speech doctrine to lawyers' self-promotion.
The Court provided that specific limits on wording in advertisements
were not appropriate unless shown to be in fact misleading or inher-
ently misleading. Prophylactic rules to limit ads that were consid-
ered "undignified" or "emotional" were determined to be invalid as
having insubstantial justification.29 Advertisements, if truthful, could
indicate a specialization 30 and be targeted to particular audiences. 31
Even mailings that targeted particular individuals or types of potential
customers could not be barred, unless they were false or misleading.32
As will be discussed later, there were strong dissents in these
cases urging a return to the pre-Bates days, but the majority held, and
there even seemed to be some strong indications that the majority
would expand its broad commercial speech protection to in-person
solicitation.
In Edenfield v. Fane,33 the Court addressed a Florida rule which
banned certified public accountants from conducting in-person solici-
tation. The Court held the rule to be unconstitutional under the com-
mercial speech doctrine in an eight-to-one vote with Justice O'Connor
dissenting. Specifically, the Court said that the Ohralik decision al-
lowing a ban on in-person solicitation was unique:
We reject the [state's] argument and hold that, as applied in this
context, the solicitation ban cannot be justified as a prophylactic
rule. Ohralik does not stand for the proposition that blanket bans
on personal solicitation by all types of professionals are constitu-
tional in all circumstances .... Ohralik's holding was narrow and
depended upon certain "unique features of in-person solicitation by
lawyers" that were present in the circumstances of that case.34
28. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
29. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
30. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of I11., 496 U.S. 91, 110 (1990).
31. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 626.
32. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 471 (1988).
33. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
34. Id. at 1802. For a discussion of the facts in the Ohralik case, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 25-27.
[Vol. 31:485
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Even as late as 1994, the Supreme Court again suggested that
broad commercial speech was to be provided to professionals, includ-
ing lawyers. In lbanez v. Florida Department of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Board of Accountancy,35 Florida barred a lawyer
who was a Certified Public Accountant [CPA] and Certified Financial
Planner [CFP] from advertising those designations in a Yellow pages
ad and on her business card.
Ibanez's activities were not false, deceptive, or misleading, said
Justice Ginsburg for the Court. To justify any restriction under the
commercial speech doctrine, the Court said, citing cases involving law-
yer advertising, the State "must demonstrate that the harms it recites
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material
degree."36 In other words, to justify a restriction, real harm and not
speculative harm had to be shown.
Despite these supposedly clear signals that commercial speech by
lawyers would continue to be broadly protected, there were some
hints, especially in retrospect, that the "winds, they were a'changin."
A consistent minority, led by Justice O'Connor rejected Bates and its
progeny. In fact, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association,37 Justice
O'Connor, s joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
stated point blank that these cases were "built on defective premises
and flawed reasoning. '39
Specifically, Justice O'Connor went back to the original dissent in
Bates. It is not appropriate to allow price advertising on legal services.
There are no such things as "routine legal services." Legal services
can be differently analyzed and cost can depend upon treating each
client separately and individually. A comparison of lawyer services
35. 114 S. Ct. 2084 (1994).
36. Id. at 2089 (quoting Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1800).
37. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
38. Justice O'Connor had earlier indicated her opposition to applying the commercial free
speech doctrine to lawyers, concurring and dissenting in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,673 (1985). Speaking for herself, then Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger, she stated that "the use of unsolicited legal advice to entice clients poses enough of a
risk of overreaching and undue influence to warrant [a prophylactic rule]." Id. Moreover, she
attacked the majority for confusing commercialism and professionalism. Merchants promise to
provide free samples of their wares but this can't be done when you are dispensing professional
advice. There is an enhanced possibility for confusion and deception in marketing professional
services - which are not standardized - and the attorneys personal interest in obtaining busi-
ness may color the advice offered in soliciting a client. Id. at 674. There is also a substantial
interest in requiring independent professional judgment and a rule permitting the use of legal
advice in advertisements will encourage lawyers to present that advice most likely to bring in
potential clients. Id. at 678.
39. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 480.
1996]
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and other consumer products is a "defective analogy." Restrictions on
lawyers' self-promotion have a specific and "delicate role in preserv-
ing the norms of the legal profession. '40 There is an ethical obligation
to temper one's selfish pursuit of economic success by adhering to
high standards. The goal is public service - which can take a variety
of forms. Ethical standards are an appropriate means of restraining
lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably wield
in a political system like ours.4'
Justice O'Connor then suggested the broad breadth that should
be given to controls by states over its lawyers. First, the determination
of standards is "properly left to the states [and is] certainly not a fit
subject for constitutional adjudication. ' 42 Next, "it is worth recalling
why lawyers are regulated at all."' 43 We are "a trained and specialized
body of experts." 44 This can lead some to attempt "to manipulate the
system"'4 - through overzealous representation - by abusing the
discovery process. But, the more difficult problem is
abuse of the client for the lawyer's benefit.... It would be unrealis-
tic to demand that clients bargain for their services in the same arms
length manner that may be appropriate when buying an automobile
or choosing a dry cleaner....
[We are not] a trade or occupation like any other. Given the
inevitable anti-competitive effects, [rules and restrictions] should
not be thoughtlessly retained or insulated from skeptical criticism.
Appropriate modifications have been made in light of reason....
In my judgment, however, fairly severe constraints on attorney ad-
vertising continue to play an important role in preserving a legal
profession as a genuine profession .... I can only hope that the
court will recognize the danger before it is too late to effect a worth-
while cure.46
In short, says Justice O'Connor, lawyers are professionals; the
real danger is treating lawyers as mere business people and thus fail-
ing to recognize the essence of professionalism and its fragile or neces-
sary foundations.
Justice O'Connor was able to gain a majority in Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc. Her original colleagues in Shapero were joined first
by Justice Thomas. This, of course, was no real surprise. Justice
40. Id. at 488.
41. Id. at 488-89.
42. Id. at 486.
43. Id. at 489.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 489-491.
[Vol. 31:485
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Thomas had indicated in prior cases his almost total congruence with
Justice Scalia on constitutional issues.47 More of a surprise was that
Justice Breyer joined to make the five-to-four majority declaring the
Florida rules valid.
Make no mistake, Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. is a fundamen-
tal rejection of the premises of Bates. Justice O'Connor, almost totally
disregarding the series of cases from Bates to Shapero, but totally con-
sistent with her own opinions, distinguishes lawyering from other busi-
nesses and indicates that lawyers are, in fact, not business persons.
States have very broad power to regulate lawyers.48 Lawyers are dif-
ferent than pharmacists, than eye doctors, than accountants. Main-
taining the appropriate image of the profession - professionalism -
is a substantial government interest.49  Moreover, even though the
rule precluded even mail notices to accident victims within 30 days,
the Florida Bar, said the Court, was justified in promulgating the rule
to protect the "privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and
their loved ones."5 The Court, of course, disregards the privacy and
fairness issues involved in the Florida rule that still allows defense and
insurance counsel to contact the victims during the 30 day period.51
47. See Marcia Coyle, An Emboldened Majority Breaks Ground, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995,
at C2 (commenting that Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Scalia ninety percent of the time).
48. In Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2376-77, the Court wrote:
We have little trouble crediting the Bar's interest as substantial. On various occasions
we have accepted the proposition that "States have a compelling interest in the practice
of professions within their boundaries, and ... as part of their power to protect the
public health, safety, and other valid interests they have broad power to establish stan-
dards for licensing practitioners and regulating the practice of professions." Our prece-
dents also leave no room for doubt that "the protection of potential clients' privacy is a
substantial state interest." In other contexts, we have consistently recognized that
"[t]he State's interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home
is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society." Indeed, we have noted
that "a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the
State may legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions."
Id. (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 2376 (holding that the rule was intended to protect the reputation of the legal
profession).
50. Id.
51. See Went For It, 115 S. Ct. at 2881-82 (Kennedy, J., dissenting):
I take it to be uncontroverted that when an accident results in death or injury, it is often
urgent at once to investigate the occurrence, identify witnesses, and preserve evidence.
Vital interests in speech and expression are, therefore, at stake when by law an attorney
cannot direct a letter to the victim or the family explaining this simple fact and offering
competent legal assistance. Meanwhile, represented and better informed parties, or
parties who have been solicited in ways more sophisticated and indirect, may be at
work. Indeed, these parties, either themselves or by their attorneys, investigators, and
adjusters, are free to contact the unrepresented persons to gather evidence or offer
settlement. This scheme makes little sense. As is often true when the law makes little
sense, it is not first principles but their interpretation and application that have gone
awry.
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How about the second part of the Central Hudson test - the
need to show that the interests here are "directly advanced by the
regulation at issue?" Here the Court looks at a submission by the
Florida Bar of a 106 page summary of a two year study of lawyer
advertising. Sampling and anecdotal information indicated the public
has "negative feelings" and that some advertising tactics are "annoy-
ing or irritating" or made recipients angry. No empirical data is re-
quired. This is sufficient to show a "direct relation."5 2
Moving to the third part of the Central Hudson test, Justice
O'Connor finds a "reasonable fit" between the harm and the rule.
Not much is needed to be shown as commercial speech provides much
less of a review:
What our decisions [in commercial speech cases] require,... is a
'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen to accom-
plish those ends, a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable;
that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is in proportion to the interest served, that employs not
necessarily the least restrictive means but.., a means narrowly tai-
lored to achieve the desired objective. Of course, we do not equate
this test with the less rigorous obstacles of rational basis review
53
There is, of course, a vigorous dissent by Justice Kennedy, joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.54 They are outraged. First,
Justice Kennedy indicates that commercial speech by lawyers should
get more, and not less, protection:
Attorneys who communicate their willingness to assist potential cli-
ents are engaged in speech protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. That principle has been understood since Bates....
The Court today undercuts this guarantee in an important class of
Id.
52. Id. at 2377-78. The Court rejected the clear statement in Shapero that privacy could not
be a real issue when dealing with mail that can be merely thrown away by stating:
[T]he harm targeted by the Florida Bar cannot be eliminated by a brief journey to the
trash can. The purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail ban is to forestall the outrage
and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that the practice of direct solicita-
tion only days after accidents has engendered. The Bar is concerned not with citizens'
"offense" in the abstract, but with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such "of-
fense" has on the profession it regulates. Moreover, the harm posited by the Bar is as
much a function of simple receipt of targeted solicitations within days of accidents as it
is a function of the letters' contents. Throwing the letter away shortly after opening it
may minimize the latter intrusion, but it does little to combat the former.
Id. at 2379 (citations omitted).
53. Id. at 2380 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
54. Id. at 2381.
[Vol. 31:485
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cases and unsettles leading First Amendment precedents, at the ex-
pense of those victims most in need of legal assistance....
I take it to be uncontroverted that when an accident results in
death or injury, it is often urgent at once to investigate the occur-
rence, identify witnesses, and preserve evidence. Vital interests in
speech and expression are, therefore, at stake when by law an attor-
ney cannot direct a letter to the victim or the family explaining this
simple fact and offering competent legal assistance.55
There is no substantial justification for this rule, pleads Justice
Kennedy. As to protecting personal privacy and tranquility, the issue
should be overreaching and undue influence. Here we are dealing
with a ban on letters, and a letter, like a printed advertisement, can
readily be put in a drawer to be considered or ignored later. The fact
that some may be offended by receiving such a solicitation is just not
sufficient.5 6
As to the second interest, protecting the reputation and dignity of
the legal profession - the professionalism argument - mail solicita-
tion, if anything, supports the professionalism of the bar. It "serves
vital purposes" and "promotes the administration of justice" by pro-
viding increased access to legal services.
[T]o the extent the bar seeks to protect lawyers' reputations by
preventing them from engaging in speech some deem offensive, the
State is doing nothing more ... than manipulating the public's opin-
ion by suppressing speech that informs us how the legal system
works. The disrespect argument thus proceeds from the very as-
sumption it tries to prove, which is to say that solicitations within 30
days serve no legitimate purpose. This, of course, is censorship pure
and simple; and censorship is antithetical to the first principles of
free expression.57
The dissent also indicated that there was no direct advancement
of a legitimate interest here as no real evidence was shown to show a
direct relationship of the rule and the interests involved. This suppos-
edly complete Florida Report is "noteworthy for its incompetence"
and lack of specificity.58 There is also no tailoring, let alone narrow
tailoring here. Simply stated, even assuming all the arguments made
by the Florida Bar are valid:
The Bar's rule creates a flat ban that prohibits far more speech than
necessary to serve the purported state interest. Even assuming that
55. Id. at 2381 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2382-83 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2383 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2384 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
1996]
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interest were legitimate, there is a wild disproportion between the
harm supposed and the speech ban enforced. It is a disproportion
the Court does not bother to discuss ....
Justice Kennedy makes a frontal attack on the bias he feels is
present in the majority opinion. First, it is as likely as not that acci-
dent victims will welcome contact - at least by mail - from an
attorney. 60
Second, the majority opinion is an example of "latent protection-
ism" as it allows other types of solicitation that are more socially ac-
ceptable and is economically discriminatory as its disallows that form
of solicitation that is most likely to reach the poor or uneducated. 61
Third, the majority opinion lacks common sense and is patroniz-
ing. For example, Justice Kennedy comments:
Here, the Court neglects the fact that this problem is largely self-
policing: Potential clients will not hire lawyers who offend them.
And even if a person enters into a contract with an attorney and
later regrets it, Florida, like some other States, allows clients to re-
scind certain contracts with attorneys within a stated time after they
are executed. 62
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy continues:
To begin with, the ban applies with respect to all accidental injuries, whatever their
gravity.... There is, moreover, simply no justification for assuming that in all or most
cases an attorney's advice would be unwelcome or unnecessary when the survivors or
the victim must at once begin assessing their legal and financial position in a rational
manner.
Id. at 2384-85.
60. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
There is, moreover, simply no justification for assuming that in all or most cases an
attorney's advice would be unwelcome or unnecessary when the survivors or the victim
must at once begin assessing their legal and financial position in a rational manner.
With regard to lesser injuries, there is little chance that for any period, much less 30
days, the victims will become distraught upon hearing from an attorney. It is, in fact,
more likely a real risk that some victims might think no attorney will be interested
enough to help them. It is at this precise time that sound legal advice may be necessary
and most urgent.
Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The only seeming justification for the State's restriction is the one the Court itself of-
fers, which is that attorneys can and do resort to other ways of communicating impor-
tant legal information to potential clients. Quite aside from the latent protectionism
for the established bar that the argument discloses, it fails for the more fundamental
reason that it concedes the necessity for the very representation the attorneys solicit
and the State seeks to ban. The accident victims who are prejudiced to vindicate the
State's purported desire for more dignity in the legal profession will be the very persons
who most need legal advice, for they are the victims who, because they lack education,
linguistic ability, or familiarity with the legal system, are unable to seek out legal serv-
ices ....
Id. at 2385 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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I think Justice Kennedy is mostly correct, but not entirely. I think
it is appropriate for the bar and the state supreme courts to protect
the privacy of accident victims. It might be appropriate to say no con-
tact by any lawyer for thirty days. But the Court did not say that. It
only upheld a ban on contact by plaintiffs' attorneys, or potential at-
torneys. You still have contact from the other side. Secondly, I also
believe that regulation against coercion - even by prophylactic rules
- is appropriate - but again must be applied to all attorneys on both
sides of a potential dispute.
Justice Kennedy's conclusion, however, is clearly correct. "To-
day's opinion [in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.] is a serious depar-
ture not only from our prior decisions involving attorney advertising,
but also from the principles that govern the transmission of commer-
cial speech." 63 The clear implication from the majority opinion is that
the Florida Bar, and other supreme courts and bar associations, if the
five Justice majority is maintained, may go back at least partially to
the pre-Bates days. These institutions can determine that this ad or
action or letter is tacky; this one is not tacky. They can pick and
choose. Look here, says Florida, and now the Court - what is the
biggest example of tackiness - ambulance chasing. So we allow them
to pick ambulance chasing for regulation and set up a 30-day rule for
plaintiffs' attorneys. The idea that defense counsel or insurance coun-
sel can contact accident victims is not relevant. That's a choice the bar
can make - in its evaluation of what is or is not appropriate.
Of course, who are the people that are going to regulate the law-
yers? We lawyers will regulate the legal profession, and which law-
yers? The people who are in charge of the Bar Association. And who
generally are those people? The people who have the resources to
run for office in the Bar association and then give up substantial time
to devote to Bar activities. How many of these are in small or solo
practice that may depend on advertising and other means of public
communication I will leave to the reader to assess.
II. HURLEY V. IRISH-AMERICAN GAY3 LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL
GROUP OF BOSTON
The next case, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisex-
ual Group of Boston,64 dealt with privacy and freedom of association.
63. Id. at 2386 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
64. 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
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In Hurley, a group of individuals - the South Boston Allied War
Veterans Council - were the organizers of the annual St. Patrick's
Day parade in Boston. In 1993, they sought and obtained a permit for
a parade. They refused a place in the parade to the Irish American
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston [called GLIB] who
sought to be included "as a way to express pride in their Irish heritage
as openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to demonstrate that
there are such men and women among those so descended, and to
express their solidarity with like individuals who sought to march in
New York's St. Patrick's Day Parade." 65 When they were refused per-
mission to participate, they sued, and the Massachusetts courts upheld
their claim that the bar was a violation of the state's public accommo-
dations laws, which barred discrimination against groups in public ac-
commodation on the basis of many classifications, including sexual
orientation.66
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed - in a unani-
mous opinion. The War Veterans Council had a constitutional right to
free expression - and privacy or autonomy to control their own
speech.67 The First Amendment, said the Court, grants this group of
war veterans, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, and its
individual members through the group, the right to express itself
through this parade. This meant that not only could the Council in-
clude whatever groups they desired in this parade, but they also could
exclude whatever groups they wanted to as well. 68 Being forced by
the government to allow the GLIB group into their parade would
force the War Veterans Council to say something that they did not
want to say.69
65. Id. at 2341.
66. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293
(Mass. 1994).
67. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2348.
68. Justice Souter, writing for the whole Court, used a musical analogy:
Petitioners' claim to the benefit of this principle of autonomy to control one's own
speech is as sound as the South Boston parade is expressive. Rather like a composer,
the Council selects the expressive units of the parade from potential participants, and
though the score may not produce a particularized message, each contingent's expres-
sion in the Council's eyes comports with what merits celebration on that day. Even if
this view gives the Council credit for a more considered judgment than it actively made,
the Council clearly decided to exclude a message it did not like from the communica-
tion it chose to make, and that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to
shape its expression by speaking on one subject while remaining silent on another.
Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 31:485
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The Hurley case is the inverse of the usual free speech case.
Here, the government was not, in violation of the First Amendment,
barring speech. Rather, it was compelling a group or individual to say
certain things - also a violation of the First Amendment.7"
A basic premise of the decision is an assumption that the parade
was a type of speech.
Real '[p]arades are public dramas of social relations, and in them
performers define who can be a social actor and what subjects and
ideas are available for communication and consideration.' Hence,
we use the word "parade" to indicate marchers who are making
some sort of collective point, not just to each other but to bystand-
ers along the way.... Parades are thus a form of expression, not just
motion ....
The Hurley case may be considered troubling if it is considered
not just an issue of free speech by a private group, but a reiteration of
a trend by the Court to limit what is considered governmental action.
Here, South Boston Veterans Council sought and obtained a parade
permit from the City of Boston. The Court did not weigh the rights of
GLIB to force the government to condition the granting of that
parade permit on the basis of the First Amendment rights of GLIB.72
It accepted the position of the GLIB to not raise the state action
issue.73
The Court, of course, had the independent authority, when a con-
stitutional issue is involved, to go ahead and decide it.74 It didn't and
[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear witness
to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organ-
ized marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as
much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals and indeed as members of
parade units organized around other identifying characteristics. The parade's or-
ganizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to
unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other reason for wish-
ing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade. But whatever the reason, it boils down
to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is
presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control.
Id. at 2348.
70. Compare Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state requirement to display "Live
Free or Die" on license plates violates First Amendment).
71. Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2345.
72. The Massachusetts Courts dismissed the public accommodations claim against the city
as there was no state action. Id. at 2342, n.1.
73. Id. at 2344.
74. As the Court itself indicated in Hurley, 115 S. Ct. at 2344, constitutional review "carries
with it a constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole,
without deference to the trial court." Id.
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this is consistent with the recent trend to narrow findings of state ac-
tion. For example, in Moose Lodge v. Irvis,75 the Supreme Court held
that when a private club gets a liquor permit from the government, the
government can't turn around and say "You can't discriminate!" The
club is private and the mere granting of a license by the state to such a
club is not state action. Similarly, as indicated this term in Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,76 when the government
allows someone to put up a cross, or a Christmas tree, or a Hanukkah
menorah, the government is not therefore endorsing those ideas.
There is no establishment of religion by the government.
Remember what was being asked by GLIB in the Hurley case. It
was willing to accept "concurrent [or, to use an old phrase, separate
but equal] exercise of speech rights." GLIB, in essence, was saying,
let us demonstrate and have a parade at the same time. We don't
have to be identified with your Veteran's Council. We'll even go and
hold a sign saying 'we're not part of this group' if that's what you
want.
But the Supreme Court barred GLIB from conducting its St. Pat-
rick's Day parade as speech by not finding any public speech rights
involved. In my opinion, if you carry this position to its logical ex-
treme - and I think the Court has in many situations - that means
the government itself must be the direct violator or actor - not the
authorizer, but the actor - for there to be a First Amendment right as
against the government. Instead of this case being about a balancing
of First Amendment rights, it becomes one of merely focusing on the
First Amendment protected rights of the Veteran's Council as against
the private and unprotected speech rights of GLIB. Suppose, just sup-
pose, the government gives permits or contracts to private entities to
run prisons, schools, or police departments. Will violations of the pro-
tections set out in the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments not be reviewable for constitutional infirmity because there was
no government involvement in the private activity? That issue -
privatization - rather than the right to conduct your own parade may
be the real legacy of Hurley.
Of course, it may just be that Hurley is not that broad. Here the
Court was dealing with a group - gays, lesbians, and bisexuals -
which the Supreme Court has said in Bowers v. Hardwick77 may be
75. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
76. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
77. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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classified by states as criminals (an issue, of course, beyond the scope
of this discussion). If the body or group seeking to participate in the
parade was more "traditional" or "mainstream" - composed, for ex-
ample, of individuals of a particular religion or race or ethnic group -
the Court may have been more sympathetic.
On the other hand, if it is that broad, it may even go so far as to
allow discrimination by a private group which gets a permit to operate
a radio, television, or cable station. The only remedy for such discrimi-
nation would be federal statutes and even then such statutes might be
held to violate the free speech rights of the broadcasters.
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